Introduction
Core conclusion of the work: the desire for recognition is healthy when …
I am recognized in both respect and esteem.
The desire for recognition must not be so strong as to consume the logic/enjoyment of the activities I am winning recognition in.
When I am pursuing to be better or best, I must be able to fail at those pursuits without thinking that life is not worth living.
When I am pursuing to be better or best, I can’t be doing it to dominate others but because I can affirm the direction itself.
I must have a strong enough internal core of judgment such that the esteem people provide me does not make me value appearance over essence.
I must have a strong enough internal core of judgment such that the esteem people provide me makes me “exist outside of myself” (alienation).
I only take delight in praise when two other conditions are met 1. I am indeed praiseworthy 2. The praise-giver is a good judge.
All of these can be interpreted as esteem being secondary (in priority, in strength, etc.) and what keeps esteem secondary is that I do not conceive of my self-conception as “better in kind” or overly deserving. That will inflame all of these and turn them into their inflamed counterparts.
Amour Propre (AP)
AP 1. Seeks esteem 2. Esteem it desires is comparative (relative in the first sense, measured against others) 3. Esteem is held in eyes of others ie. Not self-esteem (relative in the second sense, measured by others).
His goal is to 1. Give an understanding of what AP is 2. Why it is problematic / prone to corruption 3. How it opens up far-reaching developmental possibilities.
Rousseau places AP in a central place in his system which constitutes a theodicy
Like Augustine, AP is prideful and associated with the root of evil
It is core to humanity and not something we can abandon
… thus the path of salvation is to adapt it / nurture it (which is possible)
Wants to show why a world where evil is possible is preferable to the alternative (because of freedom)
Exonerates God and Nature allowing us to affirm creation. Even if this affirmation is very “lite” because unlike Hegel or Augustine, a good ending is not determined — in fact, it’s terribly unlikely. This is still quite an achievement because it gives people reason to hope and to get rid of the satanic desire of hating creation.
Peculiarities of Neuhouser's interpretation
Draws a sharp distinction (stronger than other interpreters) between amour-propre and amour de soi. The causal force identified in SD and prescriptions in SC and E are not understandable without it.
He treats AP as not solely bad (even if the majority of its manifestations are and it is easily corrupted). It has a good side and, even stronger, the good side, once developed, can treat the ills of the bad. This good side is overlooked because 1. E which talks about it is not read as often as SC and SD 2. It is mostly negative in SD 3. It is not explicitly identified as AP in SC so even the positives are not attributed to it.
He focuses on SD, SC, and E but that is not because the other works aren’t noteworthy but because he thinks these three constitute a system that enable him to tease out an important feature of Rousseau’s thought on the effects of recognition on society.
He treats SD, SC, and E as constituting a single coherent system of thought. Most people treat them as conflicting given Rousseau’s marks on incompatibility between the education of the citizen and the man in E. Neuhouser alleviates this concern by suggesting that what is incompatible is ancient citizen (Sparta, Rome) and man (modern individual). SC and E are all about creating citizen-men. E is first about the training of the man (defined by being a moral sovereign, being able to affirm things oneself through reason) and then the education of citizenship (defined by being able to will the general will). SC also reconciles this tension because willing the general will through one’s own sovereign will is how he creates societies that are aligned but still preserve freedom (something Sparta and Rome fail at).
Neuhouser is going to interpret Rousseau without the idea of a strong difference between sexes. This goes against Rousseau but is the more philosophically productive way to partake this project. What worries Neuhouser is if Rousseau’s philosophical prescriptions are too closely tied with having a underclass of non-citizens to do the dirty work. Ie. You can only form citizen-men with a class of humans who are not in that class.
Part 1 Human Nature and Its Passions
1. The Nature of Amour-Propre
This chapter is a close reading of a crucial paragraph in the Second Discourse that draws the key distinction between Amour-Propre and Amour de Soi.
The differences between Amour-Propre and Amour de Soi
The reward of AP is not just a mere sentiment but existence/being — a confirmation of one’s reality.
AP is after esteem ADS is after physical goods.
AP is much more malleable than ADS which is much more bounded.
AP is relative in two senses of the word 1. It seeks relative social standing 2. It wants that relative social standing in the eyes of others.
Crucially, Neuhouser argues that recognition is desired for its own sake even outside of the fact that it is needed for self-esteem. He wants to suggest even healthy adults with non-pathological AP and strong self-esteem require recognition.
AP is “artificial” while ADS is “natural”
There is a normative judgement, the former can lead us astray whereas the latter is affirmable
We share ADS with animals whereas AP is solely human
The most important part of artificial is that AP is social. That is to say its not something we invented (like the camera) but its something that ceases to function outside of social environment (because of the third constraint that what it seeks is judgement in the eyes of others).
It is artificial also in the sense that because it is malleable and it is highly dependent on societal organization, we have the power to change its manifestation even if we cannot be freed from it.
AP’s pathways are also responsible for language. Both require comparison to properly function. Each of the constraints neuhouser outlines shares an overlapping capacity that is required for another constitutive function of humanity. AP is artificial in that it is responsible for all these other distinctively human capacities:
Esteem —> Normative Judgement
Comparison —> Language
The opinion of others —> Reason
The similarities between AP and ADS
Like ADS, AP is a desire and not a belief. It is a desire that is heavily determined by beliefs (specifically, self-conception) which is what makes it so malleable.
They are both species of self-love. AP could be an outgrowth of ADS. ADS is genetically prior to AP.
Neuhouser ends the chapter by trying to answer the question: is this fundamental drive for recognition also a human Good for Rousseau? He answers in the positive because:
It is something that almost everybody desires for its own sake.
It is something that is universalize able and not incompatible with freedom. Hobbes thinks it is only because he has too limited a view on how AP can manifest.
It is responsible for a whole host of goods without which one would not be recognizably “human.”
Part II Diagnosis
2. The Dangers of Amour Propre
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight key components of AP and show why it may be so prone to danger.
First half of the chapter is to understand, critique, and develop a common understanding of what “inflamed” AP is.
The common reading of inflamed AP is simply inegalitarian AP. It is inflamed because:
Its confirmation requires others to value your trait more highly than their own (Seems difficult, the concern goes).
Recognition of superiority becomes a scarce good.
There exists an insatiable drive to improve one’s own lot.
The issue with this reading is the failure to distinguish between respect and esteem. Respect is about being treated as a human (general) equal to other humans; esteem is about being praised for one unique feature of oneself as an individual (particular).
Wanting to be the best is the most “natural” way to win esteem but not the only way.
Esteem “precedes” respect in the limited sense that to desire esteem is easier because it only requires the conception of the individual, whereas respect requires a general conception of man and why he deserves respect (reason, suffering, freedom, etc.)
Esteem and Respect are not substitutes even if they do form some kind of economy such that the presence of one lessens the need for the other. The dominant thinks that respect is all we need, but clearly these are separate goods.
Once we see esteem as a necessary component of AP, we understand why an egalitarian prescription wouldn’t work: it’s unlikely that esteem (which is about particulars) will be netted out evenly.
Second half of the chapter is to highlight five features of AP that make it prone to danger/perversion/inflammation.
The satisfaction of AP gives being to the self.
The force of AP is extremely strong because the social existence of the self is at stake.
It can infect and co-opt the logic of another pursuit. Something that you pursue for intrinsic reasons could be co-opted by AP.
AP seeks relative standing.
Relative so easily means “better”.
If that’s the case ^ then you end up with a rat race where the goalpost keeps moving.
If everyone’s AP takes on an inegalitarian form, then no one will be satisfiable as a collective.
It gives you an incentive (not identifiable in any other of the passions to bring others down instrumentally. We can also gain a direct desire for domination.
AP seeks standing in the eyes of others.
We can exist “outside of ourselves” which results in a lost of integrity.
One way to understand lost of integrity is that one has no sovereign core to judge whether things are good or bad. You will sacrifice other legitimate goods to conform closer to the opinions of others.
The other way to frame this is that one fully exists outside, fully determined by others opinions and this is alienation (for our sense of self to exist fully outside oneself).
Note this is not related to inegalitarian form of AP, this is also why egalitarian AP cannot be the sole prescription.
Rousseau tried and failed to ignore and suppress his AP but he couldn’t.
Opinion is constitutive of the good sought by AP
This can lead people to care more about appearance rather than reality.
AP is mediated by a self-conception
Self-conceptions can be so wildly off and inflated in all sorts of ways — overestimation is a widespread phenomenon.
Note: Rousseau does not see the mirage-like nature (as does Girard) to be a bad consequence of this malleability.
3. The Varieties of Inflamed AP
The goal of this chapter is to detail all the ways that AP can be inflamed so that the next chapter can detail how that inflammation can be resolved. Most of the chapter, however, deals with one specific species of inflammation: the question for superiority.
The ways that AP can be inflamed are already fully laid out to us in the previous chapter:
AP can become feverish in strength consuming other goals
AP seeks superiority to others that thwarts its ability to be universally satisfied, creates endless/needless desires, and gives reasons for individuals to actively bring others down.
AP makes one lose their integrity
AP makes people confuse appearance for reality
AP gives exaggerated sense of one’s own importance
In what ways is the pursuit of superiority inflamed.
Being the best is not the only but it’s the most natural form of AP. Even when it is not just about being best, esteem necessitates relativity. Because it is about being noteworthy enough to win esteem and that is comparative.
Here is what makes desire for superiority non-problematic for the individual.
Superiority is not sought for its own sake or, even worse, to dominate others but only to 1. Win esteem 2. Out of a desire for excellence in the craft. Esteem can be desired for its own sake but superiority cannot be. Ie. You can desire to be better/best in so far as that will get you what you desire for its own sake — esteem.
Superiority is so integral to esteem (built right into the concept) that we may say someone desires superiority as well. But it’s important to only desire it for esteem. e.g. You should only want to be president and not want to get more votes for its own sake (to, say, humiliate your opponent) but they are so conjoined that you do want to get more votes too.
Esteem cannot be all-consuming causing you to lose your integrity.
The esteem you win must be both affirmable by you (subjectively) but also worthy of affirmation (objectively, actually good).
This may be one way of resolving the dilemma of how one can still be free while dependent on an external source. Much like how the general will is external but affirmed by the subject, the esteem-er, the recognizer only has force over you if you affirm it according to your own standard of judgement. That is to say you are still not determined by anything outside of you.
Recognizing the recognizer, esteeming the esteem-er is a reciprocal but not equal relationship. It does not require them to be equals but merely a good judge
Here is what makes desire for superiority compatible with universalizability:
Wanting to get special respect (more deserving of goods) is not universalizable, but wanting to be most highly regarded by a specific set of people (like one’s lover) is.
Wanting to do well in a particular talent is also universalizable.
Wanting to do BEST in a particular talent clearly is not. But it is so natural a desire that it can’t really be eradicated and it is so clearly important for humanity. The way to get around this is that if you fail to be BEST, the society around you should have other available species of esteem (e.g. merely being good) that can satisfy your esteem. That means a society can’t have an all-or-none mentality where your only goal in life is to be the best and a failure to achieve that equates to a failure of life.
The system must net out rewards commensurate with merit.
Once someone has achieved a superior standing they cannot believe they are “of a more excellent nature”
You clearly cannot believe you are more deserving of respect just because you are more deserving of esteem. And those who are incompetent (not deserving of esteem) cannot be thought of as deserving less of respect. That is to say you can’t confuse being better in specific talent to being more worthy as person.
You can take pride in, congratulate yourself, take delight in things that you didn’t work for (natural gifts, luck, help from others) but you cannot think that you deserve it.
There are two pathways of exaggeration … one is to exaggerate what one is responsible for within ones talents (exaggeration in degree); the other is to have a strong belief in ones specific talents be an indicator that one is a more worthy person (exaggeration in kind).
It does seem that Rousseau does permit one to be esteemed by natural gifts and even take some pride in it (while fully comprehending it is arbitrary). The vanilla/standard form of esteem implies that one is deserving of that esteem and, thus of one's gifts. But Rousseau is saying here there is a more limited form of esteem where you are esteeming someone for thing that happened to them.
4. Why Inflamed Amour-Propre is So Common
Before we can talk about prescriptions, we need to talk about why inflamed version of AP is so common ie. We need to trace out the pathways that cause their inflammation.
All of these pathways will be revealed to be not necessary but highly natural for human (individual and social) development. What this means is that Rousseau will exonerate human nature and creation itself from blame. However he will also show how natural these pathways of inflammation are such that only very conscious, artificial intervention can resolve it (topic of next section).
Going to look at the multivariate developmental factors in SD and E which cause inflammation.
SD: social causes
When AP appears in SD it’s the desire to be the best (but we’ve already discussed how that’s not necessarily problematic).
It’s more how AP is this spark and then you have four (highly likely) socio-historical conditions which act as the fuel:
Differentiation (inequality) amongst individuals inflame desire for superior standing
Division of labor make subjects dependent on each other. “What yoke could be imposed on men who need nothing?” It’s because of dependency that exploitation can exist and that the desire for mastery over others can be an end in itself.
Increase in productivity means that there is time for leisure (only when the lower-level Maslow’s goods are satisfied can we chase after these social goods) and luxury (which contributes to AP’s inflammation by creating different ends).
Private property provides limitless avenues for people to compete and show off.
If these were the only conditions under which AP needs to be inflamed, then humanity would be in trouble since they are so common. Thankfully there are two other supporting conditions that make this combustion happen:
The society only gives recognition when you are the best/outdo others (only the most exaggerated versions of esteem and no respect at all)
Ignorance of all of this was the issue. Ignorance of how seemingly innocuous decisions (“the man circumscribing the land”) leads to disaster. This is why philosophy will have an important role to play in society’s rehabilitation.
E: Psychological causes of inflammation
Infancy and fostering the will to dominate
Infants cannot satisfy their own ADS. The only way it does so is by screaming and crying.
The infant is a tyrant then but if they are just commanding to satisfy ADS its not inflammation and its not a drive to domination (at least not for its own sake, which would be worrisome).
Rousseau needs another psychological tool: the active principle, the desire to see one’s will and existence reflected in the world.
The crying infant discovers that it can get this active principle satisfied by commanding adults even if it doesn’t need anything. In fact, because of how impotent it is, it can get this active principle satisfied only through commanding adults.
The active principle is what first awakens AP. AP is a subset of the active principle as it relates to the social world.
Doesn’t this get dangerously close to suggesting that all babies necessarily have a drive for domination? Rousseau would say they all have done it for its own sake and thus all have a taste (importantly, drive for domination lays dormant within man) but whether it develops into an enduring desire is up to parenting (e.g. not acquiescing to a baby when it doesn’t have needs and just wants attention).
Another extreme would be to be violent to the baby or to ignore its needs even when they are genuine, they can grow up to have an unfillable hole with the belief that no amount of recognition can satisfy them.
Adolescence and the drive to be the best
The first instance of AP in adolescence is to be #1. Why is this the case?
It is intimately tied with the birth of sexuality and the logic of romantic love: if I love you above all others I desire the same reciprocation (to be above all others). This is the form of romantic love and thus what form AP first takes as well.
But why does romantic love take this exclusionary force? Is this not a cultural contingency?
Neuhouser offer too interpretations that both then trace the romantic form of love to relationship of baby to caretaker.
The first argument is that AP is really a sprouting out of ADS in that 1. Initially ADS and AP were both about getting caretaker to serve us. Because we couldn’t satisfy our own ADS for every instance we had to have services of others (which confers AP) 2. AP, like ADS is also a form of self love. The self it seeks to benefit is the social not physical self. Because of this and the fact that ADS prioritizes itself above all others, the initial form of AP is to also prioritize oneself above all others (“I am best”).
The second argument is that adult love is outgrowth of infant love of caretaker. The infant both loves the caretaker totally (it is only source of nourishment) and desires the singular love of the caretaker (otherwise its survival is at risk). Adult love also takes on this form.
The argument is that AP first takes on the shape of the desire to be best because that is the shape of romantic desire which is itself modeled after the shape of the infant’s desire.
Part III Prescription
5. Social and Domestic Remedies
The goal of this chapter is to discuss what prescription that exist that can counteract the inflammation of AP. Latter half is pedagogical, first half is social political.
Clearly to not have AP anymore is not possible.
To throw our hands int he air and give up clearly is not the prescription either.
What is the relation between the prescriptions of SC and E?
E is about early formation before entering into society. SC is about formation after adulthood.
The more important distinction is that E is about education of the individual and SC is about the education of the citizen. Prima facie, they seem to be conflicting aims. SC is about how an individual can learn to be a part of the general will and lose the I in the we. E is about forming a core and solid basis that the I can exist independently from the We.
Framed in a different way E is about formation and keeping the child away from society so that they can develop their own solid core before AP hits, to furnish all these defensive resources. SC is about taming and directing that AP.
SC is about addressing all of the conditions (division of labor, increased productivity, social differentiation, private property, no other channels of expressing AP)
Rousseau clearly does not permit classes (aristocratic ranks) to form. The idea is that the most grotesque form of AP is to dominate others for the sake of domination. And domination relies on dependence and structured inequalities so these need to be eradicated.
Main opportunities for social standing cannot involve social subjugation of others (e.g. capturing slaves in war is another example).
But even wealth inequality (without solidified classes) is not ok. For two reasons…
Disparities in wealth create the type of dependence discussed above.
They also create environments/incentives/foundations for grotesque displays of difference that further inflame AP. What’s crucial here is that by limiting massive differences in wealth, not only do you remove a main CHANNEL of AP’s expression you also remove a main cause of its inflammation. This is because that unlike say personal merit wealth is fungible with almost everything else and it can turn everything into a status game. Thus a society that worships wealth to a high degree inflames AP more than a certain society that worships say artistic ability (because more objects in life are transmutable with wealth than artistic ability).
Institutions must also exist to satisfy and exist as appropriate channels and providers for AP.
Citizens should be recognized as equal subjects to (everyone equal before law), authors to (everyone can vote), and protected from (having a private sphere where general will does not command) the state. Of course this is only respect.
Rousseau hints at opportunities for subjects to channel their AP into practicing bravery or virtue to satisfy esteem.
A surprising institution that satisfies esteem is the nuclear family and romantic love. It satisfies even the most extreme form of AP because you are desired by your lover above all. Through institutions like marriage the state gives public recognition to this private sentiment (this is a reason why sanctity of marriage is important, because when you cheat you rob your lover of this exclusive type of esteem given to you).
Emile’s education is split into two stages, before AP is awakened and after it is awakened. More accurately, it’s about delaying the strength of AP for as long as possible until adolescence when 1. Reason emerges to constrain it 2. It becomes undeniable with the rise of sexual desire.
The early period’s strategy is to encourage Emile to pursue things only for their own sake and try to protect him from society but even being motivated by any gaze. This is to cultivate a strong, independent core.
When AP sprouts forth alongside sexual desire
Pity must be encouraged to counteract when AP starts harming others.
Imagination plays a key role here because one must identify with the victim as well as direct the sentiment of pity somewhere.
Emile is to understand the vicissitudes of fate as well as how the fortunate are undeserving of their advantages by, among other things, meditating on the likelihood of catastrophe.
A sense of equality of worth must be instilled in him.
He must realize that the traditional rewards of success are not true Goods, but even true Goods are more often than not the gift of chance rather than deserved. (Emile is one lucky recipient having had such a great education)
How the prescriptions laid out below counteract each way that AP can be unreasonably inflamed
To counter the power of AP …
Domestic education prolongs the dormancy of that passion for as long as possible (before sexual desire is awakened).
Pity needs to be fostered and expanded that counteracts the destructive tendencies of AP.
Social political institutions help reduce it by offereing other avenues of recognition.
To counter the superiority of AP …
In infancy not to encourage domination (distinguishing need from whim).
Instills principles of equality by showing the arbitrariness and unsatisfactory quality of success.
The state eradicates most extreme forms of inequality while encouraging institutions like the nuclear family which allow it to manifest in a healthy manner.
To counter the dependence created by AP …
Political institutions that provide strong forms of respect.
Pre-adolescent education that cultivates in the child a strong internal core of esteem.
To counter how AP makes people focus on appearance rather than substance …
Emile learns to judge for himself and have an independent core of reason to evaluate things.
Chronic dissatisfaction stemming from inflated expectations is resolved by …
Helping child shape how much/what kidn fo recognition one deserves.
Need to be spared early experiences of humiliation and disrespect which produce unsatisfiable urges.
6. The Standpoint of Reason
AP is a necessary faculty for flourishing human life, this is the key reason we cannot follow our stoic forbearers in denying it in any strong sense. The strategy must be of molding and not abandonment.
What is AP’s positive potential?
It is directly responsible for a whole host of human goods. In SD, the formation of AP is also the formation of “the sweetest sentiment known to man.”
AP can be channeled for positive ends (instrumentally)
The most original and interesting part of Rousseau’s explication of AP’s positive potential lies in how AP makes him a subject: freedom, morality, reason, and self-determination will be impossible. We are just gonna trace the development of reason because it is the central
Because Rousseau never properly gives us a definition of “reason,” we are going to have to reconstruct it from what he says about the general will.
Perspective of the general will
General will is about stepping out of the position of one’s immediate interests into another normative perspective.
The body which one enters when thinking from the perspective of the general will is that of the collective polis which constitutes a self (1. Numerological distinct 2. Conception of what is good for it).
The General will seeks to satisfy the good of EACH not good of ALL. That is to say it is not a utilitarian aggregation of the happiness (permitting tradeoffs between one member and another) but to ensure that everyone’s basic/fundamental needs are satisfied. The perspective you are entering into is: “does the law proposed thwart the fundamental needs of each member.” Of course since you can’t go about doing that for everyone you generalize into a perspective that is supposed to represent “each” and not “all.”
Normative force of the general will
The rule here is that you cannot overvalue any citizen’s (including your own) fundamental goods over another’s AND any citizen’s fundamental interests override any other’s non-fundamental interests. What is the normative force that enables people to go against their own immediate interests?
The normative force comes from 1. Distinguishing within oneself the fundamental (life, freedom) from the non-fundamental interests 2. Recognizing the moral equality of persons. It is out of ADS (1) but guided through equal recognition that this force becomes binding.
In what way is the general will “public” reason?
The good/just is determined by nature and not subjective. Furthermore, a lone reasoner herself can access this good. In what way, then, is the functioning of reason “public”?
Seemingly contradicting ^, Rousseau declares that, in a vote, if a Majority goes against my conclusions, then I have to submit to that majority — even stronger, believe that the majority has better captured the good. He says that “conventions” are the legitimate basis of right.
The way these are reconciled is that humans are fallible, and even if you could grasp the principles of Justice, their application is indeterminate. Therefore the reasoner must believe in her own fallibility. The flip side is that the reasoner must also give credence to the outcome of deliberation of other reasoners IF the right circumstances are at play (they are of sound mind, know all the evidence, have a spirit of participation and not egotistically minded). Thus any reasoner, if he should judge that the majority came to an opposing conclusion through sound mechanisms, should have further suspicion of his own outcome. Not only should he practically follow the majority, he should also believe that the majority captured “right” better.
Hegel would go on to extrapolate this from right to many other conclusions of reason.
Ultimately it is the confirmation of the sound group that generates the legitimacy of the obligations of the general will … even if I am the ultimate arbiter on whether the group is sound or not. Ie. If I answer “no” that still does not give my contrary position any normative force because it does not have the backing of consensus.
We are intersubjective reasoners in the sense that reasons fallibility makes it such that we gain certainty by the consensus of other sound reasoners.
So, the full use of reason is already intersubjective because 1. By obeying reason, I am recognizing their equal moral status to me 2. By obeying a contrary majority position, I am recognizing their soundness as reasoners.
7. AP's Role in Forming Rational Subjects
In this chapter, Neuhouser is trying to articulate how AP contributes to the capacity of rational agency as described in the previous. There are two large distinctions of how AP “contributes”: 1. How AP helps one enter into the standpoint/perspective of reason and 2. How AP provides the motivational resources to execute the dictates of reason.
Reason requires us to 1. Step back from our particular desires 2. Conceive of oneself as “equal” to others 3. Relinquish the claim to ultimate authority over reason.
AP is not solely responsible for rational agency. ADS and pity are needed as well. Even stronger, only ideal conditions is sufficient to produce the full ideal of rational agency. Neuhouser is merely trying to show that AP is necessary.
Both of these ways in which AP contributes can be seen as what Rousseau meant when he said to “transform into a sublime virtue the dangerous disposition out of which all our vices are born.”
The perspective of reason
It is tempting to think that AP is what gets us out of solipsism. But ADS already does this: in my attempt of satisfying my own needs, I have to think about the needs, desires, judgements, and decisions of others.
What is different is that AP forces you to inhabit another normative perspective different from your own. ADS treats the opinions of others as instrumental, evaluating them against one’s immediate normative goals. AP treats the opinion of others as an end-in-itself, as something that is authoritative. This is the unique pathway opened up.
Even more strongly, for Rousseau’s idiosyncratic understanding of reason, this authority is grounded in other ethical agents.
Pity is not enough to generate this perspective because what you value in pity is their experiences not their judgements. Furthermore, pity is unconstrained and circumscribed to a small circle. Where we need to get to is equality for all citizens. AP provides that force as well because it is the one that seeks comparison between people.
ADS cannot help us enter into the perspective of reason because 1. The position is “each” not “all” which is a much more theoretical perspective than, say, identifying with the fatherland. 2. The perspective of reason is constrained on the narrower, fundamental interests of self. It’s not the full set of goods that ADS is after.
The motivational forces of reason
There is a big debate in the history of philosophy of actions that are done merely in accordance with duty.
Kant
Anything done even with a tinge of desire for anything but duty itself is not morally praiseworthy.
For Kant, being motivated by the moral law comes from a respect of that moral law which is an extension of the respect to one self as a rational agent. Ie. The existential consequence to doing something wrong is to despise oneself.
Smith
Distinguishes between the love of true glory (desire for esteem through virtuous actions) from the lover of virtue (desire for virtue itself) and elevates the latter over the former but still praises the former over the lover of vanity (desire for esteem for any action). It is important that smith conceives of the desire of esteem constrained by virtue as a noble desire.
Smith thinks that in principle an agent can be motivated by duty alone but in ordinary behavior the desire for praise and praiseworthiness are blended together.
Aristotle also praises the lover of true glory. “Aristotle, too, comes close to Rousseau’s view when he allows for the pleasure that is a ‘consequent end’ of virtue—a pleasure that ‘completes’ virtuous activity—to count also as that activity’s aim (NE, 1174b–1175a).”
Rousseau
On one hand Rousseau seems to agree with Kant that Emile is the lover of virtue who does not aim for praise but only for praiseworthiness. He takes DELIGHT in praise but does not aim for it. “When Emile follows his reason, he is described not as seeking the approval of others but as taking delight in it; he is said to rejoice in their good opinion of him but not to act for the purpose of attaining it. The implication is that Emile, as depicted towards the end of Book IV, does not to any degree make esteem from others the aim of his virtu- ous action, though he is pleased when he is fortunate enough to find it, accepting their approval of him as a bonus, as it were, that acting rightly sometimes brings with it. In this respect Rousseau’s well-educated man seems to approximate Smith’s lover of virtue: if Emile appreciates his fellows’ esteem but regards it merely as a bonus, then for him the satisfaction that comes simply from knowing that he has acted well must by itself be sufficient to motivate his virtuous conduct.”
But in other areas he is suggesting that esteem is constitutive for rational agency.
How do we reconcile this tension? Does Rousseau praise the lover of true glory?
Neuhouser resolves this antinomy (self-sufficiency vs. motivated by the group) by suggesting there isn’t one singular source of motivation for rational activity. That it could come from both sources whose alignment is a rare but full expression of rational agency but whose conflict means that philosophy has no way to arbitrate between the two because one is not prior to the other.
The interesting answer then seems to be that it is possible to be a man of virtue but the lover of true glory is actually superior it is a fuller expression.
Emile wants something more than Smith’s lover of true glory. In addition to 1. Praise and 2. Praiseworthiness (being virtuous), he also desires 3. That the Praise-giver be worthy. (He wants to form a reciprocal community)
Here are all the ways that AP can be said to furnish the motivational resources for rational agency:
Even when one fully esteems himself in motivating rational action (done without the aim or possibility of praise) this still 1. Takes on the structure of AP, vis a vis Smith’s internal spectator, of an evaluative gaze of another that judges oneself 2. Is made developmentally possible in childhood by the child internalizing a parental authority. This is how Emile’s tutor as well as Freud theorized about the creation of the conscience.
Another way to say this is: AP motivates rational agency by helping us inhabit a practical identity with certain norms associated with it. One had to win the identity of being “roman” which came with it a set of norms and obligations. This is about winning esteem in one’s own eyes (desiring of title “roman”) as much as it is about winning the esteem of others.
One is motivated to act in accordance with reason through two external forces:
“Rational motivation normally relies also on actual esteem one receives, or hopes to receive, from one’s like-minded associates. In other words, in being moved by reason, the concern to find honor in one’s own eyes typically converges with, and is reinforced by, a concern to win it from others. This means that the drive to be recognized by others as worthy is not only developmentally necessary for rational agency; it also plays an ongoing role in motivating fully educated rational agents. There are two sets of reasons—one psychological, the other philosophical—behind Rousseau’s claim that the drive for the actual esteem of others is indispensable to rational motivation. Amour-propre is psychologically indispensable because the ‘higher’ (more sublimated) desire to be merely worthy of honor is generally too weak, and too difficult to acquire and maintain, to be relied on alone to sustain moral agency over time in the face of powerful, competing motivations. For most human beings, a wholly internally sanctioned sense of what is right is seldom enough to produce virtuous behavior over a long period of time. This psychological point converges with Rousseau’s philosophical reasons for believing that winning—if not necessarily seeking—the esteem of others is intrinsic to rational action.“
The very act of pursuing rational agency for Rousseau means we are both recognizing the group as valid moral actors and the group validates my interpretation and application of reason. That is to say, for Rousseau, the desire to determine one’s actions in accordance with reason IS the same as wanting to win the esteem of others (specifically that one is a competent interpreter and applier of a community’s ideals).
The upshot of this is that not only is AP transformed into a motor for good (rational agency) that good is able to satisfy AP: by successfully reasoning in this way, you also win recognition!
Someone who violates this suffers from AP. It’s interesting that he’s flipped Kant on his head. Someone who doesn’t seek recognition in rational action is worse because it represents an arrogance and narcissism.
Neuhouser closes his discussion on AP and rational agency with a discussion of what the other sense of relative (comparison) plays in rational agency.
Hume, Aristotle, and Smith all suggests that to win esteem is necessarily relative.
At least, because the ideal of virtue is so hard to achieve we need to compare ourselves to others like us to see how we are doing. (Even if its not for superiority we compare)
But we can’t be aiming for the relative rather than the ideal, at the very best this is a retrospective evaluative criterion but can’t be a motivation (to do good because one wants to do better than others). If comparison is involved at all, it is the desire to be “equal” as affirmed by other reasoned subjects as part of the general will.
Conclusion
Rousseau’s theory of AP has accomplished a great deal, Neuhouser thinks he is right on
The nature and aims of AP
Its centrality in human existence
Its capacity to wreak havoc
The social institutions and educational measures to remedy the ills
AP as an indispensable component of rationality
Despite this, Neuhouser thinks that Rousseau’s aims were too ambitious and this does not achieve the aims of Theodicy he had set forth, specifically
The diagnosis is flawed in trying to show that all of human evil is explainable by inflamed versions of AP.
Neuhouser thinks that something like the active principle needs to be posited to explain a direct desire for power that clearly animates the cruelties of mankind.
But even if we were to circumscribe his project to resolving inflamed AP, Rousseau has shown the causes of inflammation to be so many and its treatments to be so demanding that its not even clear if theoretically it constitutes a satisfying and harmonious system.